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GB 28526-2012Electrical safety of machinery - Functional safety of safety-related electrical, electronic and programmable electronic control systems (English PDF)

机械电气安全 安全相关电气、电子和可编程电子控制系统的功能安全

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Issued by

General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine of the People's Republic of China; Standardization Administration of China

Level / Type

National · Mandatory

Issue date

June 29, 2012

Implementation date

May 1, 2013

Scope

GB 28526-2012 is the English-translated version of 机械电气安全 安全相关电气、电子和可编程电子控制系统的功能安全.

GB 28526-2012 — This standard machinery safety-related electrical and electronic and programmable electronic control systems (SRECS) design, integration and validation requirements And give advice (see Notes 1 and 2). This standard applies to individual or combined way to use a control system to enable non-portable working machine to perform safety-related Control functions, including a group of machines working together in a coordinated manner, does not apply to portable working machine. Note 1.In this standard, the "electrical control system," the term means "electrical, electronic and programmable electronic (E/E/PE) control system", "SRECS" represents "Safety related electrical, electronic and programmable electronic control systems." Note 2.In this standard, the design assumptions complex programmable electronic subsystems or subsystem elements related to IEC 61508 requirements. This standard provides consumers Law, not of such elements as SRECS subsystem and subsystem components development. This standard is applicable standards do not restrict or impede technological progress. It does not include the desired or required by other standards or regulations for the protection of personal From danger all the requirements (for example protection, non-electrical or non-electrical interlock control). Each type of machine has unique requirements to meet the needs, To provide adequate security. This standard. --- Relates only expected to reduce the risk of personal injury or health hazards of direct access to the machine or use the machine directly caused by safety features Wide requirements; --- Limited risk of the machine itself or dangerous machine groups to work together in a coordinated manner arising directly; Note 3.reduce the risk caused by other hazards require related fields in the standard. For example, the machine is part of the processing activities, the mechanical and electrical Control system functional safety requirements should meet other requirements (such as GB/T 21109), as long as the safety-related processing. --- Does not provide non-electrical machinery (for example, hydraulic, pneumatic) control elements of the performance requirements; Note 4.Although this standard specifically for electrical control system, but the provisions of the framework and methodology can be applied to other art control system security Related components. Electrical Hazard --- does not include electrical control equipment itself caused (eg electric shock, see GB 5226.1). The objective of this standard specific provisions in Table 2. Table 2 Overview of standards and objectives Terms target Functional Safety Management To achieve SRECS functional safety requirements, provide for the necessary management and technical activities Safety-related control function specifications Establish procedures, requirements relating to safety control functions. These requirements specifications and functional requirements of safety and integrity Requirements expressed in terms of specification Design of safety-related electrical control system And Integration In order to meet functional safety requirements, regulations SRECS selection criteria and/or design and implementation. include. Select the system architecture; Select the safety-related hardware and software; Design of hardware and software; Verify the design of hardware and software to meet the functional safety requirements TABLE 2 (cont.) Terms target SRECS usage information Provisions provide SRECS use of information requirements, which provide random data. include. Provide user manuals and procedures; Provide maintenance manuals and procedures Confirm safety-related electrical control system SRECS shall apply to the confirmation process requirements. Including SRECS inspection and testing to ensure that it reaches To the safety requirements specification requirements. Modify safety-related electrical control system When modifying SRECS, the provisions modify the program requirements, including. Before any modification of the SRECS, make the appropriate plans and verification; Upon completion of any modifications to meet SRECS safety requirements specification

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Document preview — GB 28526-2012

National Standard of the People's Republic of China

ICS
29.020
Classification
K09

Issued by: General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine of the People's Republic of China; Standardization Administration of China

Contents

  • 1 Scope1
  • 2 Normative references2
  • 3 Terms and definitions, abbreviations3

Foreword

5,6.4,6.6.3,6.10,6.12 this standard are mandatory, the rest are recommended.

This standard was drafted in accordance with GB/T 1.1-2009 given rules.

This standard uses the translation method identical with IEC 62061.2005 "Safety of machinery safety-related electrical, electronic and programmable electronic control

System security features. "

The editorial changes made the following standard.

--- Standard name changed to "Electrical safety of machinery safety-related electrical, electronic and programmable electronic control systems safety function";

--- Delete international standards foreword.

The standard proposed by China Machinery Industry Federation.

The standard mechanical and electrical systems by the National Standardization Technical Committee (SAC/TC231) centralized.

This standard is drafted by. National Machine Products Quality Supervision and Inspection Center, Chinese Academy of Sciences Institute of Computing Technology Co., Ltd.

Participated in the drafting of this standard. Solid Technology (Shenzhen) Co., Ltd., Beijing KND CNC Technology Co., Ltd., Jinan Lingkang number

Control Technology Co., Ltd., Suzhou City, measuring Detection Technology Co., Ltd., Zhejiang Kaida Machine Tool Group Co., Ltd.

introduction

Since the result of automation required to increase production and reduce operating staff strength, machinery safety-related electrical control system (hereinafter referred to as

SRECS) play an increasingly important role in achieving the overall machine safety. In addition, it SRECS themselves increasingly using sophisticated electronic technology.

In the absence of standards before, people are less reluctant to accept SRECS safety-related functions to deal with major machine dangerous, because such technologies

Performance uncertainty.

This standard mechanical designers, and other personnel control system manufacturers and integrators and norms involved, SRECS design and validation

Personnel. It is required to achieve the stated performance methods and requirements.

This standard describes the specific application within the frame of the machine in the field of IEC 61508.It is mainly the major danger in order to improve the machine in the event (see

Specifications for safety-related electrical control system under ISO 12100-1 section 3.8) conditions.

This standard provides the mechanical part of the machine-specific features SRECS security framework. It includes only security lifecycle from the safety requirements with

Set to confirm the safety related aspects of processes. Requirements to provide information about the safe use of SRECS of machines, it

After phase SRECS life related.

SRECS when used as part of the safety assessment, in many cases, the machine may lead to lower risk. Typical case

Using interlocking guards, when it is open, meaning that the danger zone is accessed, then the initiative to send a signal to the electrical control system, stop

Dangerous machine operation. Similarly, in automation, the electrical control system generally used to achieve proper machining operations can often

Failure by reducing the risk of a direct result of the control system in order to achieve security. This standard provides the following methods and requirements.

--- Specify each safety-related control functions performed by the SRECS required safety integrity levels;

--- Make SRECS designed for specific safety-related control functions;

--- Designed integrated security related subsystems comply with ISO 13849;

--- Confirmation SRECS.

The standard is expected to reduce systemic risk within the framework for ISO 12100-1 described and in accordance with ISO 14121 (EN1050) description

Principles referred to, in conjunction with the risk assessment. Safety Integrity Level (SIL) assignment method recommended in information provided in Appendix A.

Taking into account the internal control system of random electrical failure or system failure probability and results, the performance and coordination SRECS expected risk

Reducing measures.

Figure 1 shows the relationship between this standard and other relevant standards.

Table 1 summarizes the application of this standard and ISO 13849-1 revision proposals.

IEC 62061 and ISO 13849-1 (under revision) provides mechanical safety-related control system design and implementation requirements. In the standard range

Inside, use any of them, it can be presumed to meet the relevant basic safety requirements. Table 1 summarizes the IEC 62061 and ISO 13849-1 (Amendment

In) range.

NOTE. ISO 13849-1 is currently being developed by ISO TC199 and CEN.TC114 making.

Diagram 1 IEC 62061 and other relevant standards

Table 1 IEC 62061 and ISO 13849-1 Recommended for (revision)

Perform safety-related control techniques ISO 13849-1 (under revision) IEC 62061

A non-electrical, such as hydraulic X are not included

B electromechanical, such as relays or limit specified complex electronic structure (see Note 1) and reach PL = e all structures and achieve SIL3

C Complex electronics, such as a programmable limit specified structure (see Note 1) and reach PL = d All structure and achieve SIL3

DA and limit the assigned structure B combination (see Note 1) and reach PL = e X See Note 3

EC limits specified structure and composition B (see Note 1) and reach PL = d All structure and achieve SIL3

FC in combination with A, B or C with A and X combination See Note See Note 2 X 3

"X" indicates that the item is processed by the column headings shown in this standard.

Note 1.The specified structure ENISO 13849-1 (Rev.) specified in appendix B, provides a simplified method to quantify performance levels.

Note 2.For complex electronics. According ENISO 13849-1 (revision) using the assigned structure, to PL = d or in accordance with any IEC 62061

structure.

Note 3.For non-electrical technology, in accordance ENISO 13849-1 (revision) as specified in part subsystem.

Electrical safety of machinery safety-related electrical, electronic and

Functional safety of programmable electronic control systems

1 Scope

This standard machinery safety-related electrical and electronic and programmable electronic control systems (SRECS) design, integration and validation requirements

And give advice (see Notes 1 and 2).

This standard applies to individual or combined way to use a control system to enable non-portable working machine to perform safety-related

Control functions, including a group of machines working together in a coordinated manner, does not apply to portable working machine.

Note 1.In this standard, the "electrical control system," the term means "electrical, electronic and programmable electronic (E/E/PE) control system", "SRECS" represents

"Safety related electrical, electronic and programmable electronic control systems."

Note 2.In this standard, the design assumptions complex programmable electronic subsystems or subsystem elements related to IEC 61508 requirements. This standard provides consumers

Law, not of such elements as SRECS subsystem and subsystem components development.

This standard is applicable standards do not restrict or impede technological progress. It does not include the desired or required by other standards or regulations for the protection of personal

From danger all the requirements (for example protection, non-electrical or non-electrical interlock control). Each type of machine has unique requirements to meet the needs,

To provide adequate security.

This standard.

--- Relates only expected to reduce the risk of personal injury or health hazards of direct access to the machine or use the machine directly caused by safety features

Wide requirements;

--- Limited risk of the machine itself or dangerous machine groups to work together in a coordinated manner arising directly;

Note 3.reduce the risk caused by other hazards require related fields in the standard. For example, the machine is part of the processing activities, the mechanical and electrical

Control system functional safety requirements should meet other requirements (such as GB/T 21109), as long as the safety-related processing.

--- Does not provide non-electrical machinery (for example, hydraulic, pneumatic) control elements of the performance requirements;

Note 4.Although this standard specifically for electrical control system, but the provisions of the framework and methodology can be applied to other art control system security

Related components.

Electrical Hazard --- does not include electrical control equipment itself caused (eg electric shock, see GB 5226.1).

The objective of this standard specific provisions in Table 2.

Table 2 Overview of standards and objectives

Terms target

Functional Safety Management

To achieve SRECS functional safety requirements, provide for the necessary management and technical activities

Safety-related control function specifications

Establish procedures, requirements relating to safety control functions. These requirements specifications and functional requirements of safety and integrity

Requirements expressed in terms of specification

Design of safety-related electrical control system

And Integration

In order to meet functional safety requirements, regulations SRECS selection criteria and/or design and implementation. include.

Select the system architecture;

Select the safety-related hardware and software;

Design of hardware and software;

Verify the design of hardware and software to meet the functional safety requirements

TABLE 2 (cont.)

Terms target

SRECS usage information

Provisions provide SRECS use of information requirements, which provide random data. include.

Provide user manuals and procedures;

Provide maintenance manuals and procedures

Confirm safety-related electrical control system

SRECS shall apply to the confirmation process requirements. Including SRECS inspection and testing to ensure that it reaches

To the safety requirements specification requirements.

Modify safety-related electrical control system

When modifying SRECS, the provisions modify the program requirements, including.

Before any modification of the SRECS, make the appropriate plans and verification;

Upon completion of any modifications to meet SRECS safety requirements specification

2 Normative references

The following documents for the application of this document is essential. For dated references, only the dated version suitable for use herein

Member. For undated references, the latest edition (including any amendments) applies to this document.

GB 5226.1-2008 Safety of machinery - Electrical machinery and electrical equipment - Part 1.General requirements (IEC 60204-1.2005,

IDT)

GB/T 15706.1-2007 Safety of machinery - Basic concepts, general principles for design - Part 1.Basic terminology, methodology

(ISO 12100-1.2003, IDT)

GB/T 15706.2-2007 Safety of machinery - Basic concepts, general principles for design - Part 2.Technical principles (ISO 12100-2.

2003, IDT)

GB/T 16855.1-2008 Safety of machinery - Safety-related control system components - Part 1.General principles for design (ISO 13849-1.

2006, IDT)

GB/T 16855.2-2007 Safety of machinery - Safety-related control system components - Part 2.Confirm (ISO 13849-2.2003,

IDT)

GB/T 16856.1-2008 Safety of machinery - Risk assessment - Part 1.Principles (ISO 14121-1.2007, IDT)

GB/T 16856.2-2008 Safety of machinery - Risk assessment - Part 2.Implementation guidance and examples of methods (ISO /T R14121-2.

2007, IDT)

GB/T 17799.2-2003 Electromagnetic compatibility - Generic standards - Immunity for industrial environments (IEC 61000-6-2.1999,

IDT)

GB 18209.1-2010 Electrical safety of machinery - Indication, marking and actuation - Part 1.Requirements for visual, auditory and tactile signals

Requirements (IEC 61310-1.2007, IDT)

GB 18209.2-2010 Electrical safety of machinery - Indication, marking and actuation - Part 2.Requirements for marking (IEC 61310-2.2007,

IDT)

GB 18209.3-2010 Electrical safety of machinery - Indication, marking and actuation - Part 3.actuator location and operating requirements

(IEC 61310-3.2007, IDT)

GB/T 20438.2-2006 Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems - Part 2.Electrical/Electronic /

A programmable electronic safety-related systems (IEC 61508-2.2000, IDT)

Functional safety GB/T 20438.4-2006 electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems - Part 4.Definitions and abbreviations

Language (IEC 61508-4.1998, IDT)

Functional safety GB/T 21109.1-2007 process industry Safety Instrumented Systems Part 1.Framework, definitions, system, hardware

And software requirements (IEC 61511-1.2003, IDT)

IEC 61508-3 electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems Functional safety - Part 3.Software requirements (Functional

safetyofelectrical/electronic/programmableelectronicsafety-relatedsystems-Part 3.Softwarere-

quirements)

3 Terms and definitions, abbreviations

3.1 Definitions of the table in alphabetical order

Definition number

Applications applicationsoftware 3.2.46

Architectural limitations architectureconstraint 3.2.36

Architecture architecture 3.2.35

Common Cause Failure commoncausefailure 3.2.43

Complex parts complexcomponent 3.2.8

Control controlfunction 3.2.14

Dangerous failure dangerousfailure 3.2.40

Requirements demand 3.2.25

Diagnostic coverage diagnosticcoverage 3.2.38

Electrical control system electricalcontrolsystem 3.2.3

Embedded Software embeddedsoftware 3.2.47

Failure failure 3.2.39

Fault fault 3.2.30

Fault-tolerant faulttolerance 3.2.31

Full variability language type fulvariabilitylanguage (FVL) 3.2.48

Function Block functionblock 3.2.32

Function block element functionblockelement 3.2.33

Functional safety functionalsafety 3.2.9

Hardware safety integrity hardwaresafetyintegrity 3.2.20

Danger (from mechanical) hazard (frommachinery) 3.2.10

Dangerous situation hazardoussituation 3.2.11

High demand or continuous mode highdemandorcontinuousmode 3.2.27

Limited variability language type limitedvariabilitylanguage (LVL) 3.2.49

Low complexity member lowcomplexitycomponent 3.2.7

Low demand mode lowdemandmode 3.2.26

Mechanical control system machinecontrolsystem 3.2.2

Table (Continued)

Definition number

Mechanical (machine) machinery (machine) 3.2.1

The average time between failures MeanTimeToFailure (MTTF) 3.2.34

The probability of dangerous failure per hour probabilityofdangerousfailureperhour (PFHD) 3.2.28

Verification test prooftest 3.2.37

Protective measures protectivemeasure 3.2.12

Random hardware failures randomhardwarefailure 3.2.44

Risk risk 3.2.13

Fail-safe safefailure 3.2.41

Safe failure fraction safefailurefraction 3.2.42

Security features safetyfunction 3.2.15

Safety Integrity safetyintegrity 3.2.19

Safety Integrity Level safetyintegritylevel (SIL) 3.2.23

Safety-related control functions safety-relatedcontrolfunction (SRCF) 3.2.16

Safety-related electrical control system safety-relatedelectriccontrolsystem (SRECS) 3.2.4

Security-related software safety-relatedsoftware 3.2.50

SIL claim limit SILclaimlimit 3.2.24

Software safety integrity softwaresafetyintegrity 3.2.21

SRECS diagnostic functions SRECSdiagnosticfunction 3.2.17

SRECS fault reaction SRECSfaultreactionfunction 3.2.18

Subsystem subsystem 3.2.5

Subsystem element subsystemelement 3.2.6

System failure systematicfailure 3.2.45

Systematic safety integrity systematicsafetyintegrity 3.2.22

Target failure value targetfailurevalue 3.2.29

Confirm validation 3.2.52

Verify verification 3.2.51

3.2 Terms and Definitions

The following terms and definitions apply to this document.

3.2.1

Mechanical machinery

Machine machine

A combination of a number of parts and components from which there is at least one part can be moved and has appropriate mechanical operation of the actuator, control

Braking and power circuit. Combinations of certain application purposes, such as materials processing, treatment, handling or packaging.

"Mechanical" This term also includes a combination of machines, the purpose of the application is about the same number of machines arranged, controlled as a complete machine

That exert their function.

Note 1.This is used in "combination" in the usual sense of the term is not only a combination of electrical components.

Note 2.rewrite GB/T 15706.1-2007, Definition 3.1.

3.2.2

Mechanical control system machinecontrolsystem

On from the process, other mechanical input element, the operator or external control device responds and generates output, the mechanical press

The system according to a predetermined manner.

3.2.3

Electrical control system electricalcontrolsystem

All electrical, electronic and programmable electronic control systems, including mechanical components for providing operational control, monitoring, interlock, communications, protection

And safety-related control functions.

Note. The safety-related control functions can be performed by a separate component or complete implementation of non-safety-related functions of the machine control system.

3.2.4

Safety-related electrical control systems Safety-relatedelectriccontrolsystem

SRECS

Whose failure could lead to an immediate increase in the risk of mechanical and electrical control systems.

NOTE. SRECS includes all electrical control system from the power circuit and control circuit, which may lead to failure of the safety function is reduced or lost.

3.2.5

Subsystem subsystem

Entity SRECS senior structural design, failure of any subsystem will lead to failure of safety-related control functions.

Note 1.The complete subsystem may consist of a number of identifiable and separate subsystem unit, assigned together to perform the role of sub-function blocks.

Note 2.This definition is limited to the GB/T 20438.4 general definition. Following a set of design elements interaction may include interaction between hardware, software and

people. System can customize an element into another system, it becomes subsystems.

Note 3.In the public language, "subsystem" can refer to any details of an entity. In contrast, the present standard uses the term "subsystem" is art

Pragmatics within clearly defined level range. "subsystem" is the first level subdivision of the system. Section is further broken down by the subsystem produced called "daughter

EC element. "

3.2.6

Subsystem element subsystemelement

Part of the subsystem consists of a single element or any element group.

3.2.7

Low Complexity element lowcomplexitycomponent

Class element.

--- Failure mode is well defined; and

--- Behavior under fault conditions can be completely determined.

Note 1.Overrides GB/T 20438.4-2006, the definition of 3.4.4.

Note 2.Under fault conditions, the behavior of low-complexity components can be determined by analysis and/or test methods.

Note 3.subsystem or subsystems element contains one or more limit switches, which may be inserted through the operation of electromechanical relays, the contacts of one or more cutting

The motor is an example of low-complexity components.

3.2.8

Complex components complexcomponent

Class element.

--- Failure mode is not well defined; or

--- Behavior under fault conditions can not be fully determined.

3.2.9

Functional safety functionalsafety

Safety - Part machinery and mechanical control system depends on the correct function of the SRECS, other technology safety-related systems and external risk

Reduction facilities.

Note 1.Overrides GB/T 20438.4-2006, the definition of 3.1.9.

Note 2.This standard only consider applications depends on the function of mechanical safety SRECS proper function.

Note 3.ISO /IEC Guide 51 is defined as a security risk exemption can not be accepted.

3.2.10

Danger (from the machine) hazard

Potential physical injury or damage to health sources.

Note 1.Overrides GB/T 15706.1-2007, definitions 3.6.

Note 2.The term hazard can be expected by their origin or nature of the injury (eg, risk of electric shock, crush hazard, cutting hazard, toxic hazard, fire hazard) were

Provisions.

3.2.11

Dangerous situation hazardoussituation

Personnel exposed to hazardous environments.

NOTE. rewrite GB/T 15706.1-2007, definitions 3.9.

3.2.12

Protective measures protectivemeasure

Measures to reduce risks.

NOTE. rewrite GB/T 15706.1-2007, definitions 3.18.

3.2.13

Risk risk

The probability of occurrence of injury and injury severity synthesis.

[GB/T 15706.1-2007, the definition 3.11]

3.2.14

Control controlfunction

Assessment information or input signal and generates an output information or action function.

3.2.15

Security features safetyfunction

Its failure will result in an increased risk of machine functions immediately.

[GB/T 15706.1-2007, the definition 3.28]

Note. This definition differs from GB T 20438.4 and GB/T 16855.1 definition /.

3.2.16

Safety-related control functions Safety-RelatedControlFunction

SRCF

Control function having a predetermined level of integrity SRECS execution, expected to maintain a safe condition of the machine or prevent the risk

An immediate increase.

3.2.17

SRECS diagnostic functions SRECSdiagnosticfunction

Expected SRECS for detecting faults, and upon detecting a failure to produce a specific output or action function.

Note. This feature is expected to detect a possible cause SRCF dangerous failure and trigger specific fault reaction.

3.2.18

SRECS fault reaction SRECSfaultreactionfunction

When a fault in the SRECS range by SRECS diagnostic function detects, triggering the feature.

3.2.19

Safety Integrity safetyintegrity

In all cases the provisions, SRECS su...

......

......
This preview omits tables, figures, formulas and parts of the technical clauses. The complete document — all pages — is available in the English PDF.

Referenced standards

Normative references

GB 5226.1-2008 · IEC 60204 · GB/T 15706.1-2007 · ISO 12100 · GB/T 15706.2-2007 · ISO 13849 · GB/T 16855.2-2007 · GB/T 16856.1-2008 · ISO 14121 · GB/T 16856.2-2008 · IEC 61000 · GB 18209.1-2010 · IEC 61310 · GB 18209.2-2010 · GB 18209.3-2010 · GB/T 20438.2-2006 · IEC 61508 · GB/T 20438.4-2006 · IEC 61511

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