GB/T 20274.2-2008Information security technology - Evaluation framework for information systems security assurance Part 2: Technical assurance (English PDF)

5.1 Overview of Security Technical Assurance

Evaluation framework for information systems security assurance - security technical assurance is mainly used to evaluate the system level security technology framework and the security technology solution in information systems, i.e.

5.2 Security Technology Architecture Capability Level

System security technology architecture is the description of the overall structure of the security technology system of the organization's information technology system.

The security technology architecture capability is the integral security technology system framework that conforms to the security policy development planning of information technology system of the organization and is established by the organization according to the system security risk evaluation results and the requirements of system security policy and by reference to the relevant security technology architecture standard and the optimal practice as well as in combination with the specific current status and needs of the organization's information technology system.

5.3 Examples of Security Technical Assurance Control Requirements

This article describes the examples used in the security technical assurance control requirements in this Part. Figures 1 and 2 describe some key concepts of the examples. This article provides text description for the concepts in the figure and other key concepts not in the figure. The key concepts discussed are highlighted in bold italic.

6.1 Overview

This chapter defines the contents and forms of technical requirements of this Part and provides guide for the organization which needs to add new modules into ISST.

6.1.1 Structure of information security technical assurance control class

Figure 5 illustrates the structure of security technical assurance control class in diagram.

6.1.2 Structure of information security technical assurance control subclass

Figure 6 shows the structure of security technical assurance control subclass in diagram.

6.1.3 Structure of information security technical assurance control module

Figure 7 shows the structure of security technical assurance control module.

6.1.4 Allowable operation of security technical assurance control module

The security technical assurance control modules used to define requirements in PP, ST or technology package may be exactly the same as those explained in Chapters 5~17 of this Part and may be cut to meet specific security purpose. But the dependency of the identified modules must be considered, so the selection and cutting of these security technical assurance control modules are complicated.

7.1 Automatic Response of Security Audit (FAU_ARP)

Subclass behavior

Subclass behavior For the security-related event generated under the control of TSF, this subclass defines the requirements of recording its happening. This subclass determines the audit level, lists the event type auditable by TSF and the minimal set of audit-related information that shall be provided in audit record.

7.2 Generation of Security Audit Data (FAU_GEN)

Subclass behavior This subclass defines the requirements that TSF is able to create and maintain security audit trail.

7.6 Storage of Security Audit Event (FAU_STG)

8.1 Non-repudiation of origin (FCO_NRO)

Subclass behavior Non-repudiation of origin ensures that information initiator cannot successfully deny the fact that he or she has sent the information. This subclass requires TSF to provide one method to ensure the subject who receives the information received the evidence of information origin during data exchange. The evidence may be verified by the subject or other subjects.

8.2 Non-repudiation of receipt (FCO_NRR)

Subclass behavior Non-repudiation of receipt ensures that information receiver cannot successfully deny the fact that he or she has received the information. This subclass requires TSF to provide one method to ensure the subject who sends the information received the evidence of information receipt during data exchange. The evidence may be verified by the subject or other subjects.

9.1 Key Management (FCS_CKM)

Subclass behavior Key must be managed in the whole life cycle. For this reason, this subclass defines the requirements for the following several operations. key generation, distribution, access and destruction. If any function requirement for key management, this subclass must be included.

9.2 Crypto-operation (FCS_COP)

Subclass behavior To ensure the correctness of crypto-operation function, specific algorithm and key in certain length must be in accordance with. All with crypto-operation requirements shall be included in this subclass. […]