YD/T 3594-2019General technical requirements of Security for Vehicular Communication based on LTE (English PDF)
基于LTE的车联网通信安全技术要求
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Issued by
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of PRC
Level / Type
National · Recommended
Issue date
November 11, 2019
Implementation date
January 1, 2020
Scope
YD/T 3594-2019 is the English-translated version of 基于LTE的车联网通信安全技术要求.
YD/T 3594-2019 is the Chinese standard "General technical requirements of Security for Vehicular Communication based on LTE". Its scope clause reads: This standard specifies the overall technical requirements, interface security requirements, security procedures for LTE-based vehicular communication security.
This standard applies to LTE-based vehicular communication systems. Its clauses include abbreviations; lte-based vehicular communication architecture; requirements for lte-based vehicular; security process of v5 interface; security procedures of other interfaces.
It was issued by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of PRC on 2019-11-11 and took effect on 2020-01-01.
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Document preview — YD/T 3594-2019
National Standard of the People's Republic of China
- ICS
- 33.060.99
- Classification
- M 30
Issued by: Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of PRC
Contents
- Foreword...4
- 1 Scope...5
- 2 Normative references...5
- 3 Abbreviations...6
- 4 LTE-based vehicular communication architecture...7
- 4.1 Overview...7
- 4.2 PC5 and LTE-Uu based V2X communication architecture...7
- 4.3 MBMS and LTE-Uu based V2X communication architecture...11
- 4.4 LTE-based vehicular communication security architecture...11
- 5 Requirements for LTE-based vehicular communication security...13
- 5.1 General security requirements...13
- 5.2 Security requirements for network elements...14
- 6 Security process of V5 interface...17
- 6.1 Overview...17
- 6.2 Description of security basic elements...18
- 6.3 General requirements for security data structure...21
- 6.4 Public key certificate format...22
- 6.5 Message signing process...23
- 6.6 Message encryption process...28
- 6.7 Key negotiation...34
- 7 Security procedures of other interfaces...36
- 7.1 V2X communication security process between network elements...36
- 7.2 Security process of V3 interface...36
- 7.3 Security process of MB2 interface...38
- Appendix A (Normative) Algorithm description...39
- Appendix B (Informative) Device authorization management...41
- Appendix C (Informative) Public key certificate management...55
- Appendix D (Informative) Data message of V5 interface...70
- Appendix E (Informative) Key negotiation calculation process...84
- Appendix F (Informative) Certificate request and response...86
1 Scope
This standard specifies the overall technical requirements, interface security requirements, security procedures for LTE-based vehicular communication security.
This standard applies to LTE-based vehicular communication systems.
2 Normative references
The following documents are essential to the application of this document. For the dated documents, only the versions with the dates indicated are applicable to this document; for the undated documents, only the latest version (including all the amendments) is applicable to this standard.
GB/T 37376-2019 Transportation - Digital certificate format
GB/T 37374-2019 Intelligent transport - Digital certificate application interface
3GPP TS 33.210 3G security; Network Domain Security (NDS); IP network layer security)
3GPP TS 33.223 Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic
Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) Push function)
3GPP TS 33.246 3G Security; Security of Multimedia Broadcast/Multicast
Service (MBMS)
3 Abbreviations
The following abbreviations apply to this document
BM-SC. Broadcast-Multicast Service Center
BSF. Bootstrapping Server Function
CA. Certificate Authority
E-UTRAN. Evolved UTRAN
GCS AS. Group Communication System Application Server
LTE. Long Term Evolution
MBMS. Multimedia Broadcast / Multicast Service
NAF. Network Application Function
PLMN. Public Land Mobile Network
USS. User Security Settings
4 LTE-based vehicular communication architecture
4.1 Overview
The LTE-based vehicular communication system supports vehicle-to- Vehicle (V2V) applications, vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) applications, vehicle-to- network (V2N) applications, vehicle-to-pedestrian (V2P) applications. These applications can provide users with various businesses, such as road security, transportation efficiency improvement, infotainment.
4.2 PC5 and LTE-Uu based V2X communication architecture
4.2.1 PC5 and LTE-Uu based V2X communication architecture in non-
roaming scenarios
Figure 1 shows the PC5 and LTE-Uu based V2X communication architecture in
4.2.2 PC5 and LTE-Uu based V2X communication architecture in roaming
scenarios
4.2.3 PC5 and LTE-Uu based V2X communication architecture in cross-
PLMN scenarios
4.2.4 Reference point
The reference points of the PC5 and LTE-Uu based V2X communication architecture include the following points.
4.4 LTE-based vehicular communication security architecture
4.4.1 Security protocol architecture of LTE-based vehicular
communication
4.4.2 Communication security architecture of LTE-based Internet of
Vehicles application layer
Figure 7 shows the communication security architecture of LTE-based Internet of Vehicles application layer. The functions of each functional entity, in the security subsystem, include the following points.
5 Requirements for LTE-based vehicular
communication security
5.1 General security requirements
- When a V2X device uses the service, which is provided by E-UTRAN that supports V2X communication, the 3GPP network shall provide a method
5.2 Security requirements for network elements
5.2.1 V2X device
For PC5 communication, V2X devices shall support certificate-based application layer security mechanisms. See V5 interface security for details.
For the Uu communication, V2X devices shall support LTE communication security mechanisms, including EPS-AKA-based mutual authentication, air interface encryption, integrity protection of signaling messages. Among the, for the air interface encryption, the V2X device and the LTE network shall, through negotiation, determine whether to enable it. For MBMS-based Uu
5.2.2 V2X control function
The V2X control function shall support the security mechanism, which is defined in Chapter 7.2, to protect the security of the V3 interface.
The V2X control function shall support the security mechanism, which is defined in Chapter 7.1, to protect the security of the interface with other network elements.
5.2.3 V1 interface security requirements
The security of the V1 interface is outside the scope of this standard.
5.2.4 V2 interface security requirements
The security of the V2 interface is outside the scope of this standard.
5.2.5 V3 interface security requirements
6 Security process of V5 interface
6.1 Overview
In V2X services, V2X devices interact through V5 interfaces; secure communication is handled by the application layer. V2X device includes V2X vehicles (OBU), V2X roadside units (RSU), etc. The communication integrity protection architecture, which is provided through the V5 interface, is as shown in Figure 8.The typical security process is as follows.
6.2 Description of security basic elements
6.2.1 Encoding rules
This standard uses ASN.1 to describe the data structure; uses octet encoding rules (OER) to encode various information, in the digital certificate format.
6.2.2 Definition of data structure
The atomic types, which are used in the data structure definition, shall meet the relevant requirements of GB/T 37376-2019.
The synonyms of the octet string, which are used in the data structure definition, shall meet the relevant requirements of GB/T 37376-2019.
The structure, which is used to clarify the definition, shall meet the relevant requirements of GB/T 37376-2019.
6.2.3 Hash Algorithm
The hash algorithm is defined as the HashAlgorithm type. The structure shall meet the relevant requirements of GB/T 37376-2019.
6.2.4 Elliptic curve
The elliptic curve is defined as the EccCurve type. The structure shall meet the relevant requirements of GB/T 37376-2019.
6.2.5 Symmetric encryption algorithm
The symmetric encryption algorithm is defined as the SymmetricAlgorithm type.
The structure shall meet the relevant requirements of GB/T 37376-2019.
6.2.6 Signature public key
The signature public key is defined as the PublicVerifyKey type. The structure shall meet the relevant requirements of GB/T 37376-2019.
The point on the ECC elliptic curve is defined as the ECCPoint type. The structure shall meet the relevant requirements of GB/T 37376-2019.
6.3 General requirements for security data structure
When carrying out security data communication, through the PC5 interface, the security data structure shall be unified; its content shall include at least the information in Table 1.
6.4 Public key certificate format
6.4.1 Message certificate
6.4.1.1 Certificate structure
The definition of V2X device certificate structure shall meet the relevant requirements of GB/T 37376-2019.
6.5 Message signing process
6.5.1 Overview
The signature algorithm is used to confirm the integrity and non-repudiation of the information, which is sent by the sender. The signature algorithm is used in but not limited to the following scenarios.
6.5.2 Signature data structure requirements
The signature data shall follow the data structure of 6.2, in which the data type shall be the signature data type. The information content shall at least contain the information as shown in Table 2.
7 Security procedures of other interfaces
7.1 V2X communication security process between network elements
For all interfaces between network elements.
7.2 Security process of V3 interface
7.2.1 Overview
In the V2X service, the V2X device interacts with the V2X control function, through the V3 interface. The security mechanism of the V3 interface can use the security mechanism of the PC3 interface (3GPP TS 33.303 5.3).
7.2.2 Security process of UICC configuration transmission
After the V2X device is deployed, the configuration parameters saved on the
UICC can be updated, to reflect the configuration changes.
7.2.3 Security process of data transmission
This article defines the protection process for data transmission, between V2X device and V2X control functions.
Between the V2X device and the network function, for the message which is initiated by the V2X device.
7.3 Security process of MB2 interface
It shall use the security mechanism, which is defined in Appendix N of 3GPP
TS 33.246.The V2X application server serves as the role of GCS AS in this mechanism.
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This preview omits tables, figures, formulas and parts of the technical clauses. The complete document — 86 pages — is available in the English PDF.
Referenced standards
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