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GM/T 0108-2021Decoy-state BB84 quantum key distribution product technology specification (English PDF)

诱骗态BB84量子密钥分配产品技术规范

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Issued by

State Administration of Cryptography

Level / Type

National · Recommended

Issue date

October 18, 2021

Implementation date

May 1, 2022

Scope

GM/T 0108-2021 is the English-translated version of 诱骗态BB84量子密钥分配产品技术规范.

GM/T 0108-2021 — Decoy-state BB84 quantum key distribution product technology specification

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Document preview — GM/T 0108-2021

National Standard of the People's Republic of China

ICS
35.030
Classification
L 80

Contents

  • Position of quantum key distribution products in quantum secure communication system1
  • Description of basis and state2
  • Selection of basis and state3
  • Decoding4
  • Detection5
  • Parameter estimation6
  • Parameter estimation7
  • Error correction8
  • Privacy amplification9
  • Safety design requirements10
  • Identification requirements11
  • Interface requirements12
  • Random number generator13
  • Log management14
  • Remote management15

5.1 Position of quantum key distribution products in quantum secure communication system

5.2 Network deployment of quantum key distribution products... 11

6 Requirements for implementing the decoy-state BB84 protocol... 13

6.1 Overview and protocol flow... 13

6.2 Protocol implementation... 14

7 Product requirements for quantum key distribution... 24

7.1 Basic requirements... 24

7.2 Identification requirements... 25

7.3 Interface requirements... 25

7.4 Random number generator... 26

7.5 Log management... 26

7.6 Remote management... 26 Annex A (informative) Introduction to the decoy-state BB84 protocol... 27 Annex B (informative) Composition structure of quantum key distribution products 28 Annex C (informative) Requirements for defense against attacks and protective measures... 30 Annex D (informative) Error correction methods... 32 Annex E (informative) Methods for privacy amplification... 34 Annex F (informative) Calculation formula of compression ratio during privacy amplification process... 37 Bibliography... 40 Decoy-state BB84 quantum key distribution product technology specification

1 Scope

Based on the BB84 protocol using weak coherent state light sources, this document specifies the technical implementation of each stage of the protocol and puts forward basic requirements for the design of products using this protocol.

This document is applicable to the development and testing of quantum key distribution products based on the decoy-state BB84 protocol.

2 Normative references the following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

GB/T 2423.1, Environmental testing for electric and electronic products -- Part 2:

Test methods -- Tests A: Cold GB/T 2423.2, Environmental testing for electric and electronic products -- Part 2:

Test methods -- Tests B: Dry heat GB/T 15843.2, Information technology -- Security techniques -- Entity authentication -- Part 2: Mechanisms using symmetric encipherment algorithms GB/T 15843.4, Information technology -- Security techniques -- Entity authentication -- Part 4: Mechanisms using a cryptographic check function GB/T 15852.1, Information technology. Security techniques -- Message authentication codes -- Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher GB/T 15852.2, Information technology -- Security techniques -- Message Authentication Codes (MACs) -- Part 2: Mechanisms using a dedicated hash-function GB/T 15852.3, Information technology -- Security techniques -- Message authentication codes (MACs) -- Part 3: Mechanisms using a universal hash-function GB/T 32915, Information security technology -- Randomness test methods for binary sequence A complete description of the motion state of a physical system in quantum mechanics.

It can be represented by a vector in Hilbert space.

3.18 quantum channel A channel for transmitting quantum states.

3.19 quantum information the information contained in the quantum system. Its characteristics must be described and explained using quantum mechanics.

3.20 sifted key

The data obtained after the original key is based (screened).

3.21 signal state

Quantum states used to load classical bit information.

3.22 phase randomization the process in which the sending end randomly modulates the phase of weak coherent light.

3.23 phase error rate the rate at which a quantum bit undergoes phase-flip errors. This value is used to estimate the amount of key information that an eavesdropper might know.

3.24 decoy state

A quantum state that differs from the signal state only in intensity and modulation information, but has the same other physical quantities such as frequency domain and time domain characteristics.

3.25 decoy-state BB84 protocol Based on the BB84 protocol, it uses a variety of random light intensities to monitor the channel and estimate the single-photon state characteristics, thereby solving the security problem based on non-ideal single-photon sources. For an introduction to the decoy-state BB84 protocol, see Annex A.

3.26 raw key

The original data obtained after the quantum signal is measured by the receiving end.

3.27 maximal distance

a) Quantum state preparation: the sending end prepares quantum states as information carriers. The quantum states used to load information are randomly loaded onto the corresponding light pulses. Quantum states can be characterized by physical quantities such as polarization, phase, time, spin, and momentum.

b) Quantum state transmission: the sending end sends the quantum state loaded with information to the receiving end.

c) Quantum state measurement: the receiving end randomly selects a measurement basis to measure the quantum state loaded with information sent by the sending end to generate a raw key.

d) Basis sifting: the sending end and receiving end compare the coding basis used in the preparation of the quantum state with the measurement basis used by the receiving end for detection. Both parties only retain the data using the same basis vector to generate a sifted key.

e) Error correction: the sending end and receiving end correct the quantum bit errors in the sifted key at both ends to generate an error-corrected key.

f) Privacy amplification: the sending end and receiving end compress the error-corrected key by calculating the compression ratio to generate a shared key.

6.2.1.1 Description of basis and state

Description of states: the four quantum states defining the two-dimensional Hilbert space are denoted as |phi1 >, |phi2 >, |psi1 >, and |psi2 >.

Description of basis: define two sets of basis of the two-dimensional Hilbert space, denoted by Phi and Psi, with Phi = {|phi1 >, |phi2 >}, Psi = {|psi1 >, |psi2 >}.

Information convention: when selecting a basis, define the basis Phi to correspond to the classical bit "0"; the basis Psi to correspond to the classical bit "1".

When the basis is Phi, the quantum state |phi1 > is defined to correspond to the classical bit "0", and the quantum state |phi2 > corresponds to the classical bit "1".

When the basis is chosen as Psi, the quantum state |psi1 > is defined to correspond to the classical bit "0", and the quantum state |psi2 > corresponds to the classical bit "1".

6.2.1.2 Selection of basis and state

through the quantum channel in accordance with the requirements of 6.2.1 of this standard. It records the light intensity of the emitted pulse to prepare information and code information.

6.2.3.1 Decoding

The decoding process is that the receiving end randomly selects a measurement basis to demodulate the quantum state loaded with information sent by the sending end.

The decoding process shall meet the following requirements:

According to the physical random sequence output by the random number generator, through the correspondence between binary bits 0, 1 and the basis agreed in 6.2.1.1, select the measurement basis used to measure the quantum state and demodulate the quantum state. The preparation of the measurement basis shall comply with the requirements of 6.2.1.3. The ratio of the number of preparations of the two groups of basis shall be in accordance with the preset requirements of the product.

During the decoding process, if the receiving end uses an active basis selection scheme, it shall at least have the ability to resist Trojan horse attacks.

During the decoding process, if the receiving end is actively selecting a basis (not selecting a state), it shall at least be able to resist fluorescence attacks. If the receiving end is actively selecting a basis (not selecting a state) and using multiple detectors, it shall at least be able to resist forged state attacks, time displacement attacks, and device calibration attacks.

During the decoding process, if the receiving end adopts a passive basis selection scheme, it shall at least be able to resist wavelength-related attacks and fluorescence attacks. If the receiving end adopts a passive basis selection scheme and uses multiple detectors, it shall at least be able to resist forged state attacks, time displacement attacks, and device calibration attacks.

Recommended measures to defend against related attacks during the decoding process are shown in Annex C b), c), d), e), and f).

6.2.3.2 Detection

The detection process is to detect a single photon as an information carrier, convert the detected quantum state information into classical bit information, and obtain the raw key. The current implementation method is mainly based on single-photon detectors.

The detection process shall meet the following basic requirements, interface requirements and key attribute requirements:

a) Basic requirements:

During the detection process of quantum key distribution products, if the receiving end passes through multiple detectors, it shall at least be able to resist double counting attacks.

During the detection process of quantum key distribution products, if the receiving end uses a single-photon detector based on APD, it shall at least have the ability to resist strong light attacks, dead time attacks, behind-the-gate attacks and avalanche transition zone attacks.

Recommended measures to defend against related attacks during the detection process are shown in Annex C g), h), i), j), and k).

b) Interface requirements:

1) The single-photon detector interface shall include a quantum signal interface, an electrical pulse output interface after photoelectric conversion, and a power supply interface;

2) If the single-photon detector is integrated inside a quantum key distribution product, it may have an internal interface connected to other modules (such as a serial port, network port, I2C, custom bus, etc.) for reporting the operating status of the single-photon detector (such as reporting of temperature, voltage, detection count statistics, anomalies, attack detection, etc.) and issuing specific operating process control commands (only receiving a few specific operating process control commands, such as starting a delayed scan of a gated detector and efficiency balancing self-calibration of multiple single-photon detectors (using an internal light source)).

c) Key attribute requirements:

The gated mode single photon detector shall meet the following requirements a) and

b). The free-running mode detector shall meet the following requirement b); when the receiving end adopts an active basis vector selection scheme for quantum state decoding, the detection result of each detector randomly represents the information of 0 or 1, and the following requirements a) and b) may not be met.

1) The detection efficiency half-width between channels of a multi-channel detector shall satisfy:

Where,

wmax - maximum half-height width;

wmin - minimum half-height width;

sending end through the classical channel includes the measurement basis information and the measured optical pulse position information;

2) The publicly available information transmitted from the sending end to the receiving end through the classical channel includes the transmitted optical pulse position information, optical pulse intensity information, and basis comparison results;

3) The authentication process shall be performed on all information exchanged during the basis sifting process. The process shall comply with GB/T 15852.1 or GB/T 15852.2 or GB/T 15852.3. The keys required for its implementation shall be preset in advance.

6.2.4.2 Parameter estimation

The basis sifting process shall simultaneously perform statistics on Qµ and Qv1. The results are used to calculate the compression ratio in the privacy amplification phase.

6.2.5.1 Parameter estimation

Before the error correction method is executed, the sending end and receiving end analyze the sifted key to estimate the quantum bit error rate, which is used to optimize the algorithm, improve efficiency, and confirm whether to terminate the protocol process based on the judgment conditions.

The parameter estimation process shall meet the following requirements:

a) Estimation of the bit error rate of the key qubit after sifting.

b) The estimated value E'µ of the quantum bit error rate can be used to set and adjust the operating parameters of the error correction method. The estimation methods include: estimating the quantum bit error rate based on the operating environment and other performance parameters; or estimating the quantum bit error rate of the sifted key in real time through random sampling; or estimating the quantum bit error rate of the sieve key based on the actual quantum bit error rate of the last sifted key.

c) Ideally, the security key generation rate of the BB84 protocol does not exceed 1-2H(sigma). Where H is the binary Shannon entropy. When the bit error rate sigma =11%, the security key generation rate is 0. If E'µ >=rho , rho in [0,11% ], the system is judged to be unsafe and the remaining steps are terminated. If E'µ < rho , rho in [0,11% ], the system is judged to be safe and the execution continues.

NOTE: When the error correction method does not require the quantum bit error rate as an operating parameter, the parameter estimation in 6.2.5.1 can be omitted. The determination of system safety in c) can be omitted here and performed using Eµ in step e) of 6.2.5.2.

6.2.5.2 Error correction

The error correction process is that the sending end and the receiving end correct the quantum bit errors in the sifted keys at both ends to obtain a consistent key, that is, the error-corrected key.

The error correction process shall meet the following requirements:

a) To correct the quantum bit errors in the sifted keys of both the sending end and the receiving end, an error correction method is used to correct the sifted keys.

The recommended error correction method is shown in Annex D.

b) To determine whether the keys of the sending end and the receiving end are the same, assuming that the keys are KA and KB respectively, a data verification method shall be used to determine whether KA and KB are the same.

c) If KA = KB, the error correction is determined to be successful, the key group is retained, and the next stage of steps is continued. If KA!=KB, the error correction is determined to be unsuccessful, and the remaining steps are terminated.

d) Record the number of erroneous bits of the sifted key generated by the signal state, decoy state 1 and decoy state 2 that are actually corrected, that is, the number of actual quantum bit errors MEµ, MEnu1, MEnu2.

e) Calculate the quantum bit error rate of the actual signal state, decoy state 1 and decoy state 2: .

f) Record the amount of information leakEC exposed during all error correction processes for use in the privacy amplification phase.

NOTE: If the bit error rate of the decoy state quantum state is obtained by public information from both the sending end and the receiving end, there is no need to perform processes d) to e) on the decoy state.

6.2.6 Privacy amplification

The privacy amplification process refers to the process in which the sending end and the receiving end use the hash function class to hash the error-corrected key and extract the shared key. For the recommended hash function class, see Annex E.

The privacy amplification process shall meet the following requirements:

a) The input of the privacy amplification process is the error-corrected key, and the output is the shared key.

b) Combined with the estimated or statistical parameters of the basis sifting process requirements of GB/T 2423.1 and GB/T 2423.2 according to actual conditions.

The mean trouble-free operating time of quantum key distribution products shall be no less than 4000 h.

7.1.3 Safety design requirements

The safety design of quantum key distribution products, including roles, services and authentication, physical security, sensitive security parameter management and self-testing, shall comply with the requirements of GB/T 37092.

7.2 Identification requirements

In the basis sifting and privacy amplification phases of the decoy-state BB84 protocol process in this document, all information exchanged between the sending end and the receiving end through the classical channel shall use message authentication to ensure information integrity. The authentication mechanism shall comply with the requirements of GB/T 15852.1 or GB/T 15852.2 or GB/T 15852.3.

In this document, the sending end and receiving end of the quantum key distribution product shall perform entity authentication through a classical channel to ensure the authenticity of the entity. The authentication mechanism shall comply with the requirements of GB/T 15843.2 or GB/T 15843.4.

The quantum key distribution product and the shared key management system, management platform or management tool shall also be authenticated through the classical channel to ensure the authenticity of the entity. The authentication mechanism shall comply with the requirements of GB/T 15843.2 or GB/T 15843.4. All information exchanged between them shall also be authenticated by message. The authentication mechanism shall comply with the requirements of GB/T 15852.1 or GB/T 15852.2 or GB/T 15852.3.

The keys used for message authentication and entity authentication mechanisms shall be preset in advance. When the required key is a symmetric key, it can be replaced by a shared key generated by the quantum key distribution product itself.

During the authentication process, it shall at least be able to resist replay attacks.

Recommended measures to defend against related attacks during the authentication process are shown in Annex C (l).

7.3 Interface requirements

Quantum key distribution products shall have at least a quantum channel interface, a classical channel interface, and a shared key application interface. The quantum channel interface is used for the input and output of quantum states. The classical channel interface is used for the input of data and control information, and the output of data, control information, and state information. The shared key application interface provides shared key output for application services.

The quantum channel interface shall be a fiber optic interface. The classical channel interface and shared key application interface can be connected to external devices using Ethernet, serial port, USB or other interfaces.

7.4 Random number generator

The random number generator used in quantum key distribution products shall pass the commercial cryptographic product testing and certification.

The random number generator used in quantum key distribution products shall use a random number generator based on physical processes. It can pass the random number test in four different application stages: sample test, factory test, power-on test and use test, and shall comply with the requirements of Class D products in GM/T 0062.

7.5 Log management

Quantum key distribution products shall provide a log function, and the log can be viewed and exported.

The log content includes:

a) Operational behavior, including login authentication, system configuration, key management and other operations;

b) Security events, including connection with the management platform, key generation, key update, key destruction and other events;

c) Abnormal events, including authentication failure, illegal access, integrity check failure and other abnormal events.

7.6 Remote management

Quantum key distribution products can have remote management functions, which can be used for remote key management, remote device monitoring, remote device parameter configuration, etc.

The implementation of the remote management function of quantum key distribution products shall comply with the requirements of GM/T 0050.

Annex C

(informative)

Requirements for defense against attacks and protective measures the requirements for defense against attacks and protective measures that can be adopted are as follows.

a) The sending end can adopt input isolation measures to defend against Trojan horse attacks, laser injection attacks, seed light attacks, etc.

b) When the receiving end performs quantum state measurement using an active basis selection scheme, reverse isolation measures can be used to resist Trojan horse attacks.

c) When the receiving end performs quantum state measurement for active basis selection (no state selection) and passive basis selection schemes, reverse isolation measures can be used to resist fluorescence attacks.

d) When the receiving end performs quantum state decoding for active basis selection (no state selection) and passive basis selection schemes, if multiple detectors are used, the performance of multiple detectors under the same basis group can be required to be consistent, including: consistent maximum detection efficiency, consistent gate width, consistent delay scanning curve, consistent detection efficiency of different wavelengths, etc., so as to resist counterfeit state attacks and time displacement attacks.

e) When the receiving end performs quantum state decoding for active basis selection (no state selection) and passive basis selection schemes, if multiple detectors are used, after the scanning delay process, the receiving end can compare and judge the relative delay of the gate signals of multiple detectors with the factory preset relative delay and have an abnormal alarm function to resist device calibration attacks.

f) When the receiving end uses a passive basis selection scheme to measure quantum states, a basis vector selection device with weak wavelength correlation can be used, or a filter can be added to limit the normal working wavelength range of the detector to resist wavelength-related attacks.

g) When the receiving end measures the quantum state through multiple detectors, if two detectors under the same group basis respond at the same time, a measure can be adopted to randomly select one of the results and retain it to resist double counting attacks.

......
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