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**Hazard and operability studies (HAZOP studies) -- Application
guide**

危险与可操作性分析(HAZOP分析)应用指南
(English Translation)

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Foreword

This standard was drafted in accordance with the rules given in GB/T 1.1-2009.

This standard uses the translation method equivalent to IEC 61882:2001 "Hazard and operability analysis (HAZOP analysis) Application Guide." the Chinese documents that have a consistent correspondence with the normatively cited international documents in this standard are as follows.

---GB/T 7826-2012 System Reliability Analysis Technique Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) Procedure (IEC 60812.

2006, IDT)

--- GB/T 2900.13-2008 Electrotechnical terminology credibility and quality of service (IEC 60050(191)..1990, Amend.1.

1999AndAmend.2.2002, IDT) this standard has made the following editorial changes.

--- The original international standard cited in the body of the IEC 60050 (191), but is not reflected in the normative references, now the national standard regulations Added IEC 60050 (191) to the generic reference file;

--- In order to meet actual needs, define 3.1 to add note 2;

--- The original international standard was wrong. In Figure 1, "Documents and Tracking" changed "6.6~7" to "6.6~6.7";

--- Under the original international standard 5.4 is the suspension section, now add the number "5.4.1", followed by the content number in turn;

--- In order to comply with the requirements of the flow chart in the Chinese standard, the line segment and frame in Figure 2 a) and b) have been partially modified;

--- Under the original international standard 6.2 is the suspension section, now add the number "6.2.1", followed by the content number in turn;

--- The original international standard table B.1 has no table number, now add the table number "B.1", and then the table number is successively extended;

--- The original international standard table B.6 has no table number, now add the table

number "B.6", and the subsequent table numbers are successively extended;

--- Use the English name in the responsible column in Tables B.2, B.3, B.4, B.7, and B.8 as "member A, member B, member C, member D, member E, member F, etc. substitute.

--- In order to meet the corresponding requirements in the appendix of the standard, respectively, in the standard text of Appendix B, Table B.5, Table B.7, Table B.8, Figure B.4 Add echo content.

This standard is proposed by China Machinery Industry Federation.

This standard consists of National Standardization Technical Committee for Electrical and Electronic Reliability and Maintainability (SAC/TC24), National Industrial Process Measurement and Control the Standardization Technical Committee (SAC/TC124) is under the joint management.

Introduction

The purpose of this standard is to describe the principles and steps of HAZOP analysis. HAZOP is a structuring for analyzing established systems and systematized technology. Its goal is.

- Identify potential hazards in the system. These hazards may include hazards and larger impacts that are inherently related to the existing area of the system.

The danger of ringing range, for example, certain environmental hazards.

- Identification of potential operational problems in the system, in particular identifying causes of operational interference and possibly resulting in the production of substandard products Deviation.

The important role of HAZOP analysis is to identify potential hazards and operability problems through structured and systematic methods.

It helps to determine the correct remedy.

A distinctive feature of the HAZOP analysis is an "inspection meeting" in which a multidisciplinary team is guided by the analysis team leader.

Check all relevant parts of a design or system. It uses a set of core guide words to identify deviations from system design intent. this the goal of technology is to use systematic ways to inspire the imagination of participants to identify dangerous and operational problems. HAZOP should be considered as mining Use an experience-based approach (such as a standard specification rather than another alternative) to improve the design to make it reasonable.

There are many different tools and techniques that can be used to identify potential hazards and operability issues such as checklists, failure modes, and impact analysis (FMEA), Fault